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INTRODUCTION
For decades, the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) has raised protests in Indian Country when conservation
restrictions threaten treaty rights and tribes’ sovereign use and
management of trust resources. In 1997, the Departments of the
Interior and Commerce (the “Departments”) sought to accommodate
those concerns and issued Secretarial Order 3206 (“SO 3206,” or
“Order”) to ensure enforcement would not violate the United States’s
trust responsibility toward tribal nations. The Order provided nonbinding guidance to the Departments in their consultations with tribes
and urged them to more thoroughly consider of the impact of species
listing and habitat designation on tribal interests. A decade and a half
later, SO 3206’s legacy is lukewarm. Agencies continue to treat
consultation as an empty formality without effect on their discretion.
Their actions remain unbound by the trust duty and sacred treaty
protections.1 Therefore, SO 3206’s commitments should be reviewed,
1

The federal trust duty is a distinctive obligation incumbent upon the United
States to act fairly in its dealings with Indian nations. Its contours originate in
the specific terms of treaties, statutes, and regulations. See United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983). Certain lower courts have ended their
analysis there and held that any duty is discharged by mere compliance with
such general positive law; see Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801,
810 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[The trust obligation] does not impose a duty on the
government to take action beyond complying with generally applicable statutes
and regulations.”); The Supreme Court’s approach has not been so parochial. As
the Court powerfully enunciated in Seminole v. United States, the trust duty
goes beyond mere statutory compliance and represents a “moral obligation [] of
the highest responsibility and trust.” Seminole v. United States, 316 U.S. 286,
297 (1942); It is “overriding,” Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974), and
necessary for the “fulfillment of . . . the national honor,” Heckman v. United
States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 (1912). See also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora
Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Great nations,
like great men, should keep their word.”). Thus, it extends beyond the words of
the statute or regulation that gives it life, and like any instrument establishing a
trust “many of the duties and powers are implied, . . . aris[ing] from the nature of
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and its failures in application held to criticism. Old roads must be
repaved and new ones mapped.
Part I of this Article charts the history of tribal opposition to ESA
enforcement and the government response in issuing SO 3206. Species
listing and habitat designation threaten to impair treaty rights and
restrict tribal nations in the sovereign use of their land. The issuance of
incidental take permits threatens to allow non-Indians to destroy treaty
resources. Against this background, tribes advocated for a rule that
would mitigate these concerns. What they received was a non-binding
policy order. Part I concludes with a discussion of that order.
Part II takes up the criticisms levied against SO 3206 and identifies
two major modifications to improve the operation of the ESA in
Indian Country. First, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National
Marine Fisheries Service should institutionalize the Order’s
consultation guidance by systematically requiring federal negotiators
to be committed, qualified, and able to affect project decisions.
Second, the implicated agencies should revise SO 3206 to legally bind
their discretion. The first modification draws upon tribal comments
made on Department of the Interior (“Interior”) consultation policy
while the second applies court precedent interpreting consultation
documents and trust responsibilities as applicable law binding agency
discretion.

the relationship established.” Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1099 (D.C. Cir.
2001). The nature of that relationship is commonly analogized to the trust at
common law and courts have presumed that when the federal government holds
Indian property, it must do so in accordance with “more stringent standards
demanded of a fiduciary.” Id.; see Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 at 225 (recognizing
that when the federal government assumes “elaborate control” over Indian
property, “[a]ll the elements of a common-law trust are present”). Though such a
property arrangement certainly gives rise to a trust duty, it is not essential. Even
when no property under federal title is involved, courts have required that
federal agencies interpret their mandates and other law in a manner favorable to
Indian peoples. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1445
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (declining to defer to the Department of the Interior’s
interpretation of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act when the Department failed
to heed the Indian canons of construction). Thus, for the purposes of this Article,
the trust duty may not always command a result in the Indians’ favor but rarely
ceases to bind the Services. When dealing with Indian property rights or acting
in a way that affects Indian nations, that must strive after the Indian welfare.
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I. THE BACKGROUND OF SECRETARIAL ORDER 3206
On December 28, 1973, President Nixon signed the ESA into law.
The ESA’s mandate was broad and substantive, expressing Congress’s
"plain intent . . . to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost."2 Those costs, however, have been
disproportionately borne by tribes in the exercise of their treaty
rights to hunt and fish as well as in their efforts to manage and
responsibly develop their land.
The following traces the impact of the ESA in Indian Country and
the burdens imposed by its provisions on species listing, habitat
designation, and the issuance of incidental take permits. Against this
background, it traces the response from tribal advocates, attorneys, and
resource managers, leading to the drafting of SO 3206.
A. Statutory Background: The Endangered Species Act in Indian
Country
The ESA threatens tribal interests by authorizing the Departments
of the Interior and Commerce—through the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
(collectively “the Services”)—to infringe upon treaty rights to take
listed species and freely use tribal lands that have been designated as
critical habitat, while conversely permitting non-Indians to incidentally
take treaty protected species they would not otherwise be entitled to.
By listing endangered species, the ESA may unduly impair treaty
rights to hunt and fish those same species.3 Tribes fought for centuries
to protect these rights, ultimately securing their recognition by the
United States in exchange for the massive land concessions that
allowed American expansion. Improper enforcement of the ESA’s
take prohibition threatens to abrogate those sacred rights without the
express statutory language such abrogation requires.4 Indian treaty
rights can only be abrogated when Congress’s language demonstrates
2

Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2003) (authorizing the Services to identify species in
imminent danger of extinction or under threat to become endangered in the near
future).
4
The ESA defines “take” as conduct that serves to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” members of a listed species. 16
U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2003). This broad category embraces both hunting and
fishing under treaty as well as the harms of wildlife through project development
subject to an Incidental Take Permit discussed below.
3
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the intent to abrogate after a careful consideration of the conflict with
extant rights. 5 These limitations are particularly significant in the
context of natural resources where “tribal property rights and
sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s intent to the contrary is
clear and unambiguous.”6 Absent such language, the Supreme Court
has been “extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of
treaty rights.”7 Under such circumstances, statutes will not be held to
abrogate treaty rights in “a backhanded way.”8
The Supreme Court famously avoided determining whether the
ESA abrogated treaty rights in United States v. Dion.9 In that case, the
FWS arrested several enrolled Yankton Sioux Tribe members for
hunting eagles on their reservation in alleged violation of the Eagle
Protection Act and the ESA. The Indian arrestees defended their
actions based on an implied hunting right under the 1858 Treaty
signed with the Yankton Sioux.10 Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit
recognized the right and refused to hold it abrogated, finding no
“express reference” to abrogation “in either the Act[s themselves] or
in the legislative history of the Act[s].”11 The court rejected the United
5

See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202
(1999); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346, 353 (1941)
(congressional intent to abrogate tribal property rights must be “plain and
unambiguous”); See also Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1103 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (holding the Indian canons to trump agency deference); Ramah Navajo
Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1461–62 (10th Cir. 1997).
6
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02(1) (2012 ed.)
(internal citations omitted); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202–03 (1999) (“Congress may abrogate Indian treaty
rights, but it must clearly express its intent to do so. There must be clear
evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended
action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve
that conflict by abrogating the treaty.") (internal citations omitted).
7
Washington v. Wash. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658, 690 (1979).
8
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968).
9
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
10
Id. at 734.
11
Admittedly, the conservation of endangered species may justify state
regulation of Indian treaty fisheries shared “in common” with non-Indians under
the relevant treaty. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1267 (8th Cir. 1985)
(emphasis in original); The Puyallup Court however recognized this
conservation exception in dicta and notably limited the regulatory power to
resources in which the state shares a property interest, and only when under
threat of the species’ extinction. When regulation would impair a treaty right,
the State must provide sufficient justification for its exercise. See Department of
Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973) (“[T]he police power of the
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States’s argument that Congress’s rejection of a treaty right exemption
in an earlier version of the ESA indicated the intent to abrogate.12
Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, focusing on the Eagle
Protection Act rather than the ESA. An exemption for Indians to take
eagles for religious purposes in the Eagle Protection Act showed the
intent to abrogate implicated hunting rights. 13 Congress had
considered Indian religious concerns and responded not by exempting
treaty rights, but by creating “a regime in which the Secretary of the
Interior had control over Indian hunting” through a permitting
process.14 With the matter settled under the Eagle Protection Act, the
Court declined to answer whether the ESA independently abrogated
the petitioner’s treaty rights.15 The Supreme Court has never had
another opportunity to answer that question. While in the Eighth
Circuit the ESA does not abrogate treaty rights, such rights remain at
risk everywhere else in Indian Country.16
By listing a species, the Services may not only infringe upon a
tribe’s sacred treaty right to take the species, but may also impose
arduous conservation restrictions upon Indian lands by designating
them “critical habitats” when occupied by the species or essential for
its conservation.17 The Services must, during the classification process,
consider scientific, economic, and “any other relevant impact[s],” and
exclude otherwise suitable areas if the “benefits of exclusion outweigh
State is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate of the
passenger pigeon; the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to pursue
the last living steelhead until it enters their nets.”); New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (“State jurisdiction is preempted by the
operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal
interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are sufficient
to justify the assertion of State authority.”).
12
United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985).
13
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986).
14
Id. at 743–44.
15
Id. at 746.
16
Only one federal jurisdiction has held the ESA to abrogate treaty rights,
finding the Act’s Alaskan Native subsistence exemption, and statutory language
extending the ESA to “all persons” to sufficiently meet criteria. United States v.
Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (S.D. Fla. 1987). This decision has met
extensive criticism. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act protects Alaskan
native rights, whereas treaty rights are protected, of course, by treaty. Secondly,
while in other circumstances, a law of general applicability may extend to
Indians; this presumption can be defeated by an en point treaty guarantee.
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).
17
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2003).
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the benefits of designation.”18 Those benefits are left undefined. It has
nevertheless forced tribes to shoulder an unfair and disproportionate
responsibility for conservation in environments largely degraded by
non-Indian development, while ignoring tribal sovereign resource
management rights.19
Because tribal action so often includes a federal action ingredient,
and since state, local, and private action20 in the vicinity of Indian
lands will often be included in a Biological Opinion (“BiOp”)
baseline, “a jeopardy determination is almost preordained to impose a
heavier burden on Indian lands.” 21 Because of this burden, ESA
enforcement can disproportionately “delay, curtail[] or prohibit[] . . .
development activities” in tribal construction and resource extraction,
compared with non-tribal activities.22 The inclusion of tribal lands
within designated critical habitats is “particularly offensive, in that it
effectively imposes a federal zoning system on Indian lands by
creating a wildlife ‘district’ zoned for habitat uses, while incompatible
uses, such as [tribal] oil and gas development, must be undertaken
18

Id.
Because tribal development often takes place on trust land and never is
uniquely subject to federal permitting jurisdiction, it is highly vulnerable to a
jeopardy determination. The permitting agencies are required “in consultation
with and with the assistance of the Secretary, [to] insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section
referred to as an “agency action”) is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species. 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(2) (2003). A jeopardy determination therefore can obstruct tribal
management and development far more than state or private equivalents
undertaken off federal land.
20
The ESA is triggered whenever there is an “ingredient” of federal
involvement in the action. That ingredient is present in all “projects and
programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved
by federal agencies . . . . Actions do not include funding assistance solely in the
form of general revenue sharing funds . . . with no Federal agency control over
the subsequent use of such funds. Actions do not include bringing judicial or
administrative civil or criminal enforcement actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18
(2010). The federal jurisdiction over trust land, for example, will trigger a
requirement for federal approval and thus present a federal ingredient. It is the
federal action of permitting, rather than the tribal action requiring approval,
which is directly subject to the ESA.
21
Sandi B. Zellmer, Conserving Ecosystems Through the Secretarial Order on
Tribal Rights, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, 162–63 (Winter 2000) (calling tribal
development proposals the “straw that . . . break[s] the camel’s back”).
22
Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian Lands As Critical Habitat for Indian Nations and
Endangered Species: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First, 43 S.D. L.
REV. 381, 398 (1998).
19
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elsewhere.”23 Such “zoning” ignores the widespread development of
competent and professional tribal management programs that seek to
address conservation issues more holistically than the ESA’s single
species approach.24 In this context, meaningful consultation becomes
ever more necessary to ensure that tribal resources are maintained, the
trust responsibility upheld, and conflict mitigated.
The ESA infringes upon tribal taking rights not only by protecting
species and habitat but also by opening them to non-Indian incidental
take. If a non-federal actor proposes an action that will incidentally
harm a listed species, she must apply for an Incidental Take Permit
(ITP).25 The application must include a Habitat Conservation Plan
(HCP),noting the likely environmental impact of the incidental takes,
as well as proposed steps for mitigation. The ITP is revocable if the
permittee acts out of compliance with the permit, the associated HCP,
or other applicable law.26 If either of the Services determines that the
action will affect a listed species or critical habitat, formal consultation
will be required, ending with the issuance of a BiOp, including
consideration of the ITP.27
Notably, the ESA does not require consideration of the impact on
treaty rights or call for tribal involvement in the permit issuing process.
For example, when hydroelectric giant PacifiCorp applied in the late
2000s for an ITP to continue dam operations in the Klamath Basin, a
region blanketed with Indian fishing rights, it submitted an HCP to
NMFS. 28 The application noted that such operations would take
endangered and evolutionarily significant Coho salmon by lowering
23

While such zoning is justified when protecting critical habitat from such
development generally, tribal sovereignty, treaty rights, and the competence of
tribal resource management programs demand a different approach and greater
reluctance to infringe on tribal enterprises. Id. at 418.
24
Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal
Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72
WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1068 (1997).
25
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2010).
26
16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2010); 50 C.F.R. § 13.27-28 (2001).
27
As discretionary actions, the issuing of a permit and the accompanying
Biological Opinion (“BiOp”) can be set aside if found to be “arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1996).
28
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 08EKLA00-2013-F-0014, EFFECTS OF
PROPOSED KLAMATH PROJECT OPERATIONS FROM MAY 31, 2013, THROUGH
MARCH 31, 2023, ON FIVE FEDERALLY LISTED THREATENED AND ENDANGERED
SPECIES (May 2013).
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oxygen and raising temperature in the water, while filling it with
disease.29 As a result, tribal harvest quotas would shrink in relation to
the smaller fishery. NMFS subsequently approved the ITP and issued
a 270 page BiOp in 2013, noting no serious consideration of treaty
rights of local tribes or that in issuing the ITP, the United States had
just given away the tribes’s fish.30
B. Tribal Response to Endangered Species Act Enforcement
Under the shadow of the ESA’s looming 1994 reauthorization,
tribal resource managers and lawyers began to organize around the
aforementioned concerns and examine legislative and administrative
solutions, eventually deciding to pursue a Joint Secretarial Order.31
Their inspiration was the 1994 Statement of Relationship negotiated
by the FWS and the White Mountain Apache Tribe, which had
pointed toward possible cooperative intergovernmental management
based on the Tribe’s “institutional capacity to self manage its lands.”32
White Mountain Apache Chairman Ronnie Lupe, who had negotiated
the Statement, joined the call for a secretarial order.
In response, Interior Secretary Babbitt and Commerce Secretary
Daley agreed to consult with tribal representatives to develop such an
order.33 Prominent representatives present at the negotiations included
the FWS Deputy Assistant Secretary, the General Counsel for NOAA,
treaty rights champion Billy Frank Jr., and Chairman Lupe.34 Federal
negotiators received relevant and culturally competent education in
advance and both parties developed comprehensive consultation
protocols.35 Professor Charles Wilkinson described the federal party as
an “informed, high-level team[—]in consultation with a fully involved
Solicitor[—]. . . [and with] broad authority [to] report directly to the
Secretary.”36 Secretary Babbitt called the resulting Secretarial Order
3206 “the equivalent of a treaty,” born out of mutuality between
29

Id. at 210.
Id.
31
Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal
Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72
WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1074 (1997).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 1076.
34
Id. at 1077.
35
Id. at 1078.
36
Id. at 1081.
30
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sovereign governments.37 He expressed the hope that it would “banish
forever the traditional treaty process that ha[d] been one sided,
overbearing, and not infrequently unfair.”38
C. Secretarial Order 3206: History and Substance
The Secretaries signed SO 3206 “to ensure that Indian tribes do
not bear a disproportionate burden for the conservation of listed
species, so as to avoid or minimize the potential for conflict and
confrontation.”39 Under the Order therefore, agencies must “consult
with, and seek the participation of, the affected tribes to the maximum
extent practicable” when an action may affect trust resources, tribal
rights, or Indian lands (defined to include both trust and tribally held
fee lands).40 Such participation may result in formal intergovernmental
agreements on species management, delegations of conservation law
enforcement, and the development of guidelines to accommodate
tribal access to, and traditional use of, protected species or habitats.41
In recovery actions, the Services commit to ensure “tribal
representation, as appropriate, on Recovery Teams when the species
occurs on Indian land . . . affected tribal trust resources, or affects the
exercise of tribal rights.”42
The Services must not only invite participation but must “give
deference to tribal conservation and management plans” when action
will affect resources on Indian lands and listed species.43 This requires
training and sensitivity to tribal cultures,44 and to the unique legal

37

Id. at 1086.
Id.
39
SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act), at § 1 (1997).
40
Id. § 5(1).
41
Id. § 6.
42
Id. at Appendix § 3(E). Recovery Teams, as utilized by the Services, include
representatives of all “appropriate agencies and affected interests in a mutuallydeveloped strategy to implement one or more recovery actions.” Endangered
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy
on Recovery Plan Participation and Implementation Under the Endangered
Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34272-01 (July 1, 1994). That mutual development
allows the Services’ effort to benefit from the members’ unique knowledge and
expertise regarding the species, the factors affecting it, and the appropriate
course of recovery. Id.
43
Id. § 5(3)(B) (emphasis in original).
44
Id. § 5(4).
38
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status of Indian lands. 45 In developing Reasonable and Prudent
Alternatives (RPAs), the Services must also consider “information on,
but not limited to, tribal cultural value, reserved hunting, fishing,
gathering, and other Indian rights or tribal economic development.”46
In order to minimize adverse impacts on tribal lands and resources,
the Services may only apply conservation restrictions to Indian lands
under the following narrow circumstances, when:
i) The restrictions are reasonably necessary for
conservation.47 Tribal lands can only be designated as
critical habitat if necessary for conserving a listed
species “after evaluating the possibility of excluding
such lands.”48
ii) Their purpose cannot be achieved through the
exclusive regulation of non-Indian actions.49
iii) They are the least restrictive option in their impact
upon tribal management, economic development, and
treaty rights.50
iv) They do not discriminate against Indians, as stated
or applied.51
v) Voluntary tribal measures are inadequate.52
In the Habitat Conservation Planning context, the Services must
request consultation with tribes. When other parties are involved in the
action, the Services must “encourage [them] to recognize the benefits
of working cooperatively with affected tribes” and advocate for tribal
participation in HCP development.53 If other parties refuse to invite
tribes into negotiation, the Services themselves shall consult with the
affected tribes. 54 The product of these consultations must be
considered in the development of RPAs and the Services must
“[a]dvocate the incorporation of measures . . . that will restore or

45

Id. § 5(2).
Id. at Appendix § 3(B)(3).
47
Id. § 5(3)(C)(i).
48
Id. at Appendix § 3(B)(4).
49
Id. § 5(3)(C)(ii).
50
Id. § 5(3)(C)(iii).
51
Id. § 5(3)(C)(iv).
52
Id. § 5(3)(C)(v).
53
Id. Appendix § 3(D)(2).
54
Id.
46
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enhance tribal trust resources.”55 Subsequent decisions must explain
how the trust responsibility has been addressed and accounted for.56
II. CRITICISMS OF SO 3206 AND SUGGESTED MODIFICATION IN TEXT
AND APPLICATION
For all its potential, SO 3206 bears a fatal flaw, stamped upon the
Order by federal unwillingness to make the trust duty binding. Section
2(B) disclaims that the Order “shall not be construed to grant, expand,
create, or diminish any legally enforceable rights, benefits or trust
responsibilities, substantive or procedural, not otherwise granted or
created under existing law.” It only provides internal, non-binding,
guidance.57 Unless this changes, SO 3206 will have more value for its
rhetoric than for its reality.
Because of the above disclaimer, SO 3206 has failed to alleviate
many tribal concerns with ESA enforcement. Meaningful consultation
remains elusive due to lack of federal investment in the process and
any legal recourse for tribes. This Part of the Article presents two
modifications to bolster the force of the Order. First, as tribes have
advocated, the Services must institutionally ensure the negotiators they
send to consultation are committed to the process. Second, the
Departments of the Interior and Commerce must promulgate SO 3206
as a binding regulation upon their agencies, clarifying that the tribal
rights must be considered when implicated in any ESA analysis.
A. The United States Must Ensure Service Negotiators are Committed
to Meaningful Section 7 Consultation with Tribes
The Services must invest time and resources to ensure meaningful
consultation, if they expect tribes to do likewise. Currently SO 3206
applies a higher level of commitment in consultation to actions within
the Bureau of Indian Affairs’s (BIA) jurisdiction. This high standard
must be 1) applied to any Service action implicating tribal concerns. In
meeting these high standards, the Services should ensure their
consultation negotiators have 2) received sufficient training regarding
55

Id. Appendix § 3(D)(3).
Id. Appendix § 3(D)(2) (After consultation with the tribes and the non-federal
landowner and after careful consideration of the tribe's concerns, the Services
must clearly state the rationale for the recommended final decision and explain
how the decision relates to the Services' trust responsibility).
57
Id. § 2(B).
56
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tribal concerns. Such negotiators should 3) inform tribes throughout
the decision-making process and detail their consideration of their trust
duties in writing. They must have 4) sufficient institutional power to
make the decisions at issue. Interior’s current consultation policy,
shaped by 2011’s Secretarial Order 3317, takes steps in this direction
and will be referenced where appropriate.58
1. The Services Should Treat Consultation with the Same High
Commitment SO 3206 Imposes on the BIA
Currently, the BIA is held to a uniquely high consultation duty
under SO 3206. The Order should be modified to bind all acting
agencies within Interior and the Department of Commerce
(“Commerce”) to an identical level of commitment. Under SO 3206
Appendix § 3(C)(3), the Services are required to engage in far deeper
consultation on BIA actions than on those proposed by other agencies.
This consultation includes inviting tribes to meetings between the
Services and BIA, as well as giving the tribes and outside experts the
opportunity to provide pertinent scientific data, to review data in the
administrative record, and to review biological assessments and draft
BiOps. 59 Conversely, in working with other action agencies, the
Services are merely required to “notify the affected Indian tribe(s) and
provide for the participation of the BIA in the consultation process,”
and “encourage the action agency to invite the affected tribe(s) . . . to
participate.”60 Further, in the more involved BIA consultation process,
the Services are required to use tribal management plans “as the basis
for developing any reasonable and prudent alternatives, to the extent
practicable,”61 while in other contexts, they are merely required to
“give full consideration to all [tribal] comments . . . and shall strive to
ensure that any alternative selected does not discriminate against such
tribe(s).”62 The former practice properly treats tribes as sovereigns

58

Policy on Consultation With Indian Tribes, 76 Fed. Reg. 28446-01 (May 17,
2011) (hereinafter Interior Policy); See SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3317
(Department of the Interior Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes) (Dec. 01,
2011).
59
SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act), at Appendix § 3(C)(3)(a) (1997).
60
Id. at Appendix § 3(C)(3)(b).
61
Id. at Appendix § 3(C)(3)(a).
62
Id. at Appendix § 3(C)(3)(d).
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entitled to a government-to-government process while the latter
merely allows them to file comments like other citizens.63
Contrary to SO 3206’s distinction between the responsibilities of
the BIA and those of the Services, all agencies of the “United States
bear[] a trust responsibility toward Indian Tribes, [when dealing with
Indians] which, in essence consists of acting in the interests of the
tribes.” 64 This responsibility necessarily includes responsible
consultation by all applicable Departments. Interior Secretary Sally
Jewell recently affirmed this principle in Secretarial Order 3335,
noting that “[a]s instruments of the United States that make policy
affecting Indian tribes . . . the Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of
Reclamation, Fish & Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and the
Department’s other Bureaus and offices share the same general federal
trust responsibility toward tribes.”65 As such, Appendix § 3(C)(3)
should be collapsed to apply the high standard elucidated for the BIA
context to Services consultation with all Interior and Commerce
agencies. Once the Services are held to that standard, they can deepen
their commitment to consultation by improving the training,
commitment, and capacity of their representatives.
2. The Services Should Work with Tribes to Ensure
Representatives are Better Trained to Engage with Treaty Rights
and Tribal Concerns
Representatives must be better trained to meet the high
standard embodied in SO 3206. Under § 5(2) of the Order, the
63

The Quechan Indian Tribe has argued that the mere consideration of tribal
comments neglects the “difference between [public NEPA] comments and
consultation.” Thane D. Somerville, Attorney for the Quechan Indian Tribe, et
al., Re: Comments of Quechan Indian Tribe on Proposed Policy on Consultation
with Indian Tribes, 76 Fed. Reg. 28446, II(J) (July 12, 2011) (hereinafter
Quechan Comment).
64
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1998).
Countless other cases have recognized the trust responsibility borne at every
point in the federal government. See, e.g., Skokomish Indian Tribe v. FERC,
121 F.3d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 1997); Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v.
Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999) amended on denial of reh'g, 203 F.3d
1175 (9th Cir. 2000) (regarding the Bureau of Reclamation’s duty); Nance v.
EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 710 (9th Cir. 1981); Osage Tribal Council ex rel. Osage
Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 1999).
65
SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3335 (Reaffirmation of the Federal Trust
Responsibility to Federally Recognized Indian Tribes and Individual Indian
Beneficiaries), at § 3(d) (Aug. 20, 2014).
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Services recognized the unique legal status of tribes. Such
recognition, however, requires ongoing education and training of
federal representatives. Wilkinson notes that it was critical during
SO 3206 negotiations to reserve “ample time for presentations on,
and understanding of, the cultural, historical, and legal background
. . . [as well as] the real world problems faced by field level federal
and tribal administrators.” 66 Only then were “the federal
negotiators, most of whom had previously spent little time on
Indian matters, able to understand the true distinctiveness of Indian
policy: the depth of the commitment of Indian people to preserve
and protect tribal sovereignty, their homelands, the trust
relationship, and Indian culture.” 67 In order to develop this
understanding, tribes must be invited to develop and implement
this training in order to ensure its efficacy.68 The Interior Policy
outlines a training model to be facilitated Department-wide
through the Department of the Interior University.69 This model,
developed “in collaboration with . . . tribal colleges,” “promotes
consultation,” “[o]utline[s] . . . duties concerning tribal interests,”
and “[d]escribe[s] the legal trust obligation of the Federal-Tribal
relationship,” all “with attention to the unique distinctions within
Indian Country.” 70 SO 3206 should be modified to include
development of such a model and make its immediate
implementation mandatory. 71
A proper training model, such as the one outlined by the
Interior, will enable federal negotiators to develop truly bilateral
consultation protocols and intergovernmental agreements.72 It will
66

Wilkinson, supra note 32 at 1078; See Mccoy Oatman, Chairman, Nez Perce
Tribal Executive Committee, Comments on Department of Interior Policy on
Consultation with Indian Tribes (Mar. 14, 2011) (such education must extend to
“federal Indian law, jurisdictional issues[,] treaty rights”) (hereinafter Nez Perce
Comment).
67
Id. at 1079.
68
See Nez Perce Comment supra note 67.
69
Interior Policy, supra note 59, § V.
70
Id.
71
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT’ OF
COMMERCE, NOAA 13175 POLICY, NOAA PROCEDURES FOR GOVERNMENT-TOGOVERNMENT CONSULTATION WITH FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBES
AND ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS § III (A) (Nov. 12, 2013) (hereinafter
NOAA PROCEDURES).
72
SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act), at Appendix § 5(2) (1997).
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also allow federal decision makers to maintain a proper scope of
consultation that ensures that input from affected tribes is heard
and considered rather than overshadowed by the concerns of those
without a stake. Such meaningful attention requires that agencies
not “cast[] the net of consulting tribes too broadly, in a given
action, thus unnecessarily increasing the burdens associated with
consultation and simultaneously diminishing the effectiveness of
consultation with Indian nations who are the most affected.”73 The
Quechan Tribe has noted that agencies will often invite all tribes in
their home state of Arizona to consult on a matter simply because
the action will take place somewhere in Arizona.74 In the SO 3206
context, overbroad consultation can allow unaffected tribes to
influence the conservation management of resources and lands
upon which directly affected tribes may depend. Tribal lands
should not be put at risk of critical habitat designation because of
the views of parties without interest.
3. Services Representatives Should Inform Tribes Consistently
Throughout the Decision-Making Process and Document their
Consideration of their Trust Duties
Under Appendix § 3(C)(2) of SO 3206, the Services must
“[p]rovide copies of applicable final biological opinions to affected
tribes to the maximum extent permissible by law.” In reality, however,
the Services have impeded tribal access to such documents under the
guise of federal disclosure laws. When they recommended
improvements to the National Commission on Indian Trust
Administration and Reform, the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council
contrasted the standard set forth in the Order to the current state of
affairs wherein tribes are left, like any other party, “to the Bureaucratic
Black Hole of the Freedom of Information Act.”75 Requiring tribes to
officially request this information “leaves much to be desired” and is
“applied grudgingly and responses are long delayed.”76 The Quechan
73

Quechan Comment, supra note 64.
Id.
75
Leonard Masten, Chairman, Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, Commission
Recommendations § 9 (Draft Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Documents/cle/Materials%20%20The%20Future%20of%20Trust%20Administration%20-%2010-032014.pdf.
76
Id.
74
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Tribe has noted the difference between allowing tribes the same rights
as any American to request information, and insuring the Services
inform them based on comity owed sovereign nations in a
government-to-government relationship.77
The commitment to keep tribes informed also requires that the
Services respond more fully, after adequate consideration, to tribal
concerns raised in consultation. As former Navajo President Ben
Shelly noted, SO 3206 should be modified to require the agencies and
Services to give “detailed explanation how each consulting tribe’s
comments and recommendations were considered and incorporated
into the decision, and if not, why not, and finally, how the decision is
fully consistent with the Department’s trust responsibility.”78
The failure to meet this standard is exemplified in the
aformentioned 2013 Klamath Project Operations BiOp. The NMFS
stated there that it had not had “sufficient resources to do more than a
cursory evaluation” of tribal management plans and had not invested
resources to evaluate it with involved agencies.79 Consideration of
tribal plans too often stops at a “cursory look” as the Services wait
until litigation to address the requirements for meaningful consultation
or the possible exclusion of tribal lands.80
Courts have long recognized that the trust responsibility requires a
deeper and more sincere investment. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
of Indians v. Morton, 81 the District Court for the District of
Columbia set aside an Interior rule delivering water from the
Truckee Dam to a local district that would otherwise have flown
into the Tribe’s lake, pushing the lake’s Indian fish towards
extinction.82 Because the lake was “the Tribe’s principal source of
77

Quechan Comment, supra note 64.
Ben Shelly, President, The Navajo Nation, Re: Proposed Policy on
Consultation with Indian Tribes, 76 Fed. Reg. 28446 (July 15, 2011) (hereinafter
Navajo Comment).
79
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 08EKLA00-2013-F-0014, EFFECTS OF
PROPOSED KLAMATH PROJECT OPERATIONS FROM MAY 31, 2013, THROUGH
MARCH 31, 2023, ON FIVE FEDERALLY LISTED THREATENED AND ENDANGERED
SPECIES, 204 (May 2013).
80
Marren Sanders, Implementing the Endangered Species Act in Indian
Country: The Promise and Reality of Secretarial Order 3206, JOPNA No. 20071, 28 (2007),
http://nni.arizona.edu/resources/pubs/jopna%202007_01_endangered.pdf.
81
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C.
1972).
82
Id. at 252.
78
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livelihood,”83 the Interior had a trust duty to maintain its level for
the Tribe’s use.84 Without further comment, the Secretary called
his decision a “judgement [sic] call.”85 The court instead found that
he had failed to show that call was “anything but arbitrary.”86 The
trust duty, a “moral obligation of the highest responsibility and
trust,” could not be abandoned to accommodate non-Indian
interests. 87 Rather, “[i]n order to fulfill his fiduciary duty, the
Secretary must insure, to the extent of his power, that all water not
obligated by court decree or contract with the District goes to
Pyramid Lake.”88 The Departments should continue to heed this
notion and prioritize fulfillment of the trust duty whenever possible
without waiting for a court to order such decisions. To do so, they
must enter consultation with the assumption that tribal concerns
will actually affect decision-making.
4. The Services Representatives Should be Vested with Sufficient
Institutional Power to Make or Strongly Influence the Decisions at
Issue
Federal representatives must not only be trained and committed to
consultation, but must have the clear authority to make decisions or
“present tribal views to the . . . decision maker.”89 As noted by the
Quechan Tribe, “[t]oo often, Interior has attempted to meet its
consultation obligations by sending low-level staff members to meet
with the Tribal Council.” 90 The Services should rather strive to
emulate what Professor Wilkinson called the “informed high level
team in consultation with a fully involved solicitor . . . [and] broad
authority [to] report directly to the Secretary” that negotiated SO
3206.91 Modifying SO 3206 to specify this requirement will empower

83

Id.
Id. at 255.
85
Id. at 256.
86
Id.
87
Id. (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)).
88
Id.
89
Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.S.D. 1995).
90
Quechan Comment, supra note 64.
91
Wilkinson, supra note 32, at 1081. To ensure that appropriate representatives
are chosen, it may be necessary that “[t]ribes should be afforded the opportunity
to comment on potential candidates.” Mel R. Sheldon Jr., Chairman, The Tulalip
Tribes, Comments from the Tulalip Tribes of Washington at DOI request;
84
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tribes to impact final decisions. Interior Policy takes the proper steps in
this direction by instructing the Departments to designate a Tribal
Governance Officer with access to the Secretary, who will monitor
compliance with the policy, promote consultation, and supervise
similar Bureau level Tribal Liaison Officers.92 As with training, the
designation of such dedicated personnel remains discretionary within
Commerce and SO 3206 should be modified to require that it be
mandatory.93
The goals of SO 3206 will remain merely aspirational so long as
the Services fail to embed them in their consultation procedures. The
rule currently imposes a higher consultation standard on the BIA. This
should be amended to apply equally to the Services. In implementing
rigorous frameworks of consultation, the Services should work with
tribes to devise training requirements to ensure negotiators have the
requisite education on tribal concerns before entering consultation.
Once consultation begins, the negotiators should insure tribes are kept
informed throughout the decision making process. The negotiators
should have sufficient institutional power to ultimately integrate tribal
concerns into the decision reached. While such steps would improve
consultation, they remain tenuous so long as they remain discretionary.
Therefore, SO 3206 should be promulgated as a binding rule.
B. Interior and Commerce Must Promulgate SO 3206 as a Regulatory
Rule, Requiring Consideration of Tribal Interests and Binding Agency
Discretion by the Legal Force of Treaty Rights
Tribes challenging a failure to consult have been told repeatedly
that SO 3206 has little substantive force of law. 94 Until tribes have
Department of the Interior DRAFT Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes
(Mar. 11, 2011).
92
SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act), at § VII(B) (1997).
93
NOAA PROCEDURES, supra note 72, § III(B).
94
Two district courts have recognized the Order’s failure to bind Government
action. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 2d
1328, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2006). The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians challenged the
failure of FWS and Army Corps of Engineers to consult in order to avoid
jeopardizing an endangered sparrow. Id. Count VI of their complaint alleged
that the federal defendants had “violated the Indian Trust Doctrine as reflected
in . . . Department of the Interior Secretarial Order # 3206.” Id. The court held
that his argument failed to assert a claim because the Order was “for guidance
within the Department only,” and does not create a substantive trust obligation.
Id. Similarly in Center for Biological Diversity, the plaintiffs, including two

150

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 4:131

!

“legal recourse to guarantee that the . . . agencies comply with their
[consultation] duty,” the commitments in SO 3206 will remain
“disingenuous.”95 The Order should therefore be promulgated as a
binding rule acquiring the force of law through integration into the
meaning of the statute, by clarifying: 1) the “other relevant impact[s]”
that must be considered in a BiOp include impacts on tribal interests;
and 2) federal discretion remains subject to tribal rights as relevant
“applicable law.” Through rulemaking, tribes will gain their legal
recourse to sue under the APA when the Services act arbitrarily and
capriciously without regard to their own regulations.96

tribes, asked the court to set aside an FWS finding that the desert eagle, an
important trust resource, was not a bald eagle population entitled to ESA
protection. Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, No. 10–2130–PHX–DGC,
2011 WL 6000497 (D. Ariz. 2011). While finding that the Service had engaged
in some mediocre consultation that “undoubtedly [could] have been more
meaningful to and respectful of the tribe, the court did not find SO 3206 to
“carr[y] with it specific, measurable consultation requirements that have the
force of law in the ESA context.” Id. at *11, 13.
95
Navajo Comment, supra note 79.
96
The Eighth Circuit has also recognized that discretionary policy directives
may acquire the force of law when they create a justified expectation of tribal
consultation. In Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, the court found that the
BIA was bound by its internal Personnel Management policy to consult the
affected tribe. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 717 (8th
Cir. 1979). The policy had created a “justified expectation on the part of the
Indian people that they will be given a meaningful opportunity to express their
views before Bureau policy is made.” Id. at 721. In failing to afford that
opportunity, the BIA “not only violate[d] those general principles which govern
administrative decision-making, but also violates the distinctive obligation of
trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and
sometimes exploited people.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted)
(finding “that the two meetings of the tribal delegates with Washington
officials” did not constitute meaningful). See Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer,
911 F. Supp. 395 (C.D. S.D. 1995); Fort Berthold Land and Livestock Assoc. v.
Great Plains Regional Dir., 35 IBIA 266 (2000) (holding that even if tribal
consultation guidelines did not establish “a right enforceable in Federal court,”
they may nevertheless establish such a right before “the Board, which speaks for
the Secretary of the Interior”96). Contra Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812
F.2d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that unlike in Oglala Sioux Tribe of
Indians, the BIA did not concede the Personnel policy to be binding. This
distinction was expressly rejected in Lower Brule Sioux Tribe).
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1. As a Rule, SO 3206 Should Include the Impact on Treaty Rights in
its Consideration of the “Other Relevant Iimpacts” the Services Must
Consider in the BiOp Process
In order to make SO 3206 binding, the Services should clarify that
consideration of tribal concerns constitutes a vital component of
Section 7 consultation. They can do so by including “information on,
but not limited to, tribal cultural value, reserved hunting, fishing,
gathering, and other Indian rights or tribal economic development”
referenced in SO 3206 in their ESA-required consideration of the
“other relevant impact[s]” of federal actions.97 With such a hook in the
statute, SO 3206 allows tribal factors to shape the required analysis of
when the “benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of
designation.”98
The Ninth Circuit has found that otherwise non-binding internal
directives may create a consultation requirement when such a statutory
hook is found. Within the last few years, the Te-Moak Tribe of
Western Shoshone Indians has repeatedly challenged BLM
authorizations for mining at the tribe’s holy site, Mount Tenabo, in
Nevada. 99 The tribe has argued that the authorizations violated
Executive Order 13007 because they failed to “accommodate access to
and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious
practitioners and . . . avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of
such sacred sites.”100 Like SO 3206, Executive Order 13007 was nonbinding. 101 Consequently, the court found that Executive Order
13007 had “no force and effect on its own.”102 However, “its
requirements were incorporated into [the Federal Land Policy
Management Act (FLPMA)] by virtue of FLPMA’s prohibition on
97

SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206 (American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal Trust
Responsibilities, and Endangered Species Act), at Appendix § 3(B)(3) (1997).
98
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2003).
99
Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, 565 F. App'x 665 (9th Cir. 2014); S. Fork Band Council Of W.
Shoshone Of Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 588 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2009).
100
Id. (citing Indian Sacred Sites, 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 § 2(a) (May 4, 2006)).
101
Indian Sacred Sites, 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 § 4 (May 4, 2006) (stating the order
“intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and
is not intended to, nor does it, create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by any party against the
United States, its agencies officers, or any person”).
102
Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nev. v. U.S. DOI, 565 F. App'x
665, 667 (9th Cir. 2014).
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unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands,”103 and the BLM
was thus required to comply with the Executive Order. 104 As a
promulgated rule, SO 3206 should emulate the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation and explain that consideration of impacts on tribal
interests form an integral component ESA analysis.105
2. The Departments Should Promulgate Rules Recognizing that Treaty
Rights are “Applicable Law” Constraining Service Discretion
SO 3206 should also be modified to clarify that tribal rights are
“applicable law” requiring compliance in the federal permitting
process. This is especially true in the Incidental Take Permit
context where permitted take may cut into tribal property
interests. 106 According to ITP regulations, a permit may be
suspended or revoked at any time if the permittee “is not in
compliance with the conditions of the permit or with any
applicable laws or regulations governing the conduct of the
permitted activity.”107 Tribal rights have already been recognized

103

Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988)).
S. Fork Band Council Of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. DOI, 588 F.3d 718,
724 (9th Cir. 2009).
105
The ESA statutorily requires such a consideration when species listing or
critical habitat designation will impair Alaskan Native take for “primarily . . .
subsistence purposes.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e)(1) (2010). The prohibitions that
would otherwise flow from listing or designation do not apply under such
circumstances. Instead the statute requires the relevant department engage in
formal rulemaking to “regulat[e] . . . the taking of such species by any such
[Alaskan] Indian, Aleut, Eskimo, or non-Native Alaskan resident of an Alaskan
native village.” Id. § 1539(e)(4). Such rulemaking must satisfy the APA and
only “be prescribed after a notice and hearings in the affected judicial districts of
Alaska . . . and shall be removed as soon as the Secretary determines that the
need for their impositions has disappeared.” Id.; See SECRETARIAL ORDER NO.
3225 (Endangered Species Act and Subsistence Uses in Alaska), at § 3 (Jan. 19,
2000) (requiring extensive consultation with the Native community as a
component of the rulemaking process). This process requires a recorded hearing
by the Secretary before an administrative law judge showing that “such
regulation, assessment, determination, or finding is supported by substantial
evidence.” Id. § 1371(b)(3). Arguably treaty guaranteed take deserves even
further protection, lest an “impotent outcome” result from “negotiations and a
convention, which seemed to promise more and give the word of the Nation for
more.” United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905).
106
See Winans, 198 U.S. at 382 (“the right was intended to be continuing against
the United States and its grantees as well as against the State and its grantees”).
107
50 C.F.R. § 13.27–28 (2001).
104
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as “applicable law” in general fishery management, and should be
similarly recognized in the ESA context.108
In Parravano v. Babbitt, the District Court for the Northern
District of California looked to the Department’s trust
responsibility in the context of managing “a chinook population
too small to satisfy the needs of all who have a stake in the
Klamath salmon.”109 Facing such scarcity, non-Indian fishermen
challenged the Commerce’s Klamath Chinook ocean harvest rate
that had been calculated in order to protect the Yurok and Hoopa
tribal fisheries. The court upheld the harvest rate, explaining that
under a Commerce rule, “the federally reserved fishing rights of
the Yurok and Hoopa Valley Tribes . . . are applicable law for the
purposes of the Magnuson Act.”110
The Commerce rule was promulgated pursuant to a 1991
Solicitor’s opinion, which did not restrict its analysis to the
Magnuson Stevens Fishery Management context, but rather
recognized that “all parties that manage the fishery, or whose
actions affect the fishery, have a responsibility to act in accordance
with the fishing rights of the Tribes.”111 That responsibility of all
parties required the United States to ensure that other users of the
fishery “not interfere with the Tribes’ right to have the opportunity
to catch their share,”112 regardless of the purpose for which the fish

108

Parravano v. Babbitt, 861 F.Supp. 914 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd, 70 F.3d 539
(9th Cir. 1995).
109
Id. at 914.
110
Id. at 920–21 (citing Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 68063 (Dec. 23, 1993)); see
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding fishing
rights to be “express federal law”).
111
John. D. Leshy, Fishing Rights of the Yurok and Hoopa Valley Tribes, M36979, 30 (1993).
112
Id. at 28. This property is protected against interference by non-Indian
overharvest, catch limitation, exclusion, and wrongful environmental harm. The
first three have been recognized in case law on the protection of treaty fishing
rights. The last is a longstanding principle of the common law that “[w]here a
person's fishery rights are wrongfully interrupted or interfered with by another,
he or she may maintain an action of trespass or action for damages for the injury
caused thereby.” 36A C.J.S. Fish § 20. See Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 203
(W.D. Wash. 1980) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982) on
reh'g, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Supreme Court all but resolved the
environmental issue when it expressly rejected the State’s contention . . . that the
treaty right is but an equal opportunity to try to catch fish.”).
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were taken.113 The Solicitor considered the seniority of tribal rights
and further noted, “an argument could be made that the tribal
moderate standard of living needs should be satisfied first, before
other user groups can be afforded fishing privileges.”114
Ultimately, such an approach best conforms to the Indian
canons of construction that demand treaties be read as the Indians
would have understood them. The Indian leaders who negotiated
those treaties would surely find it an “impotent outcome to
negotiations . . . which seemed to promise more” to see their
protected rights gutted by uncompensated take of the species upon
which they depended.115 They understood the protection of those
rights to stand with the force of law, rather than to bend in the
unfettered winds of agency discretion. Court precedent in other
statutory contexts urges consideration of the impact on tribal
interests and the recognition of treaty rights in listed species as part
of binding “applicable law,” barring the Services from permitting
non-Indian take of those species unless founded upon an express
congressional abrogation of those rights.116
113

Id. at 21 (noting that the tribes’ rights were based “the degree of dependence
on the fishery resource at the time the reservation was created or expanded,
rather than on what the particular uses were made of the fish”).
114
Id. at 26.
115
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905).
116
See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202
(1999). Ultimately many treaty rights constitute not only “applicable law” but
also extant property rights that cannot be taken without just compensation. See
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). In Fishing Vessel
Ass’n, the Supreme Court recognized that treaty language “secur[ing]” a tribal
right to “take” salmon in a “relatively predictabl[e] . . . harvest” guaranteed
more than “merely the opportunity to try to catch” fish. Washington v. Wash.
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 678 (1979) (internal
citations omitted). Such an expectation property interest has substance. As
recognized long ago, “the notion is intolerable that a man should be protected by
the law in the enjoyment of property once it is acquired, but left unprotected by
the law in his effort to acquire it.” Brennan v. United Hatters of N. Am. etc., 73
N.J.L. 729, 742–43 (1906). Tribes with such rights hold them in co-tenancy with
non-Indian fishermen and entitles the tribe to 50 percent of the fishery “[a]bsent
a judicial determination that a fifty percent share is no longer needed.” Allen H.
Sanders, Damaging Indian Treaty Fisheries: A Violation of Tribal Property
Rights?, 17 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 153, 162 n.57 (1996) (citing
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685). This allowance for reduction does not
invalidate the property interest. Water rights acquired by prior appropriation are
treated no differently. Furthermore when the federal government sets land aside
for an Indian reservation, it implies a reservation of necessary waters. Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908). Similarly when the United States
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SO 3206 sets an admirable standard but it is one that will not
be met until Services personnel are qualified to meaningfully
engage tribal involvement in ESA matters. While not exhaustive,
this Article has urged two steps forward to that goal. First, the
Services can engrain the Order’s purpose more deeply in their
consultation procedures. The services can do so by ensuring its
negotiators are committed to the consultation process, sufficiently
educated to do their duty, and empowered to integrate tribal
concerns into the decision making process. Second, the Services
can promulgate the Order as a binding rule rather than a mere
policy suggestion. Federal courts have shown the way, interpreting
the Departments’s statutory responsibility to impliedly incorporate
tribal concerns and policy documents on tribal involvement. As an
interpretive rule, SO 3206 should clarify that those concerns and
the treaty rights they rest upon are applicable law restricting the
Services’s actions under the ESA.

CONCLUSION
3206 was, in its time, an admirable step forward. In order to
respond to tribal concerns, two departments committed the time and
resources necessary to negotiate through educated and empowered
representatives. Their commitment produced a document that seeks to
ensure a central place for tribal concerns in ESA Consultation and
Habitat Conservation Planning, to urge a reluctance to designate
critical habitat, and a willingness to defer to tribal management. The
legacy of that commitment, however, has been lukewarm. The Order
should thus be modified to ensure that agencies do not treat
consultation as an empty ritual but as a sacred duty demanding the
involvement of committed and educated decision makers. Ultimately,
its uneven impact will only be improved if SO 3206 is modified to
bind the relevant agencies to legally require consideration of tribal
rights before federal action is taken. Only then can the ESA be
reconciled with the United States’s trust duty. Only then will the
federal government have to recognize that Indian lands are critical
habitats primarily for tribal nations, and that endangered treaty rights
deserve as much protection as the species upon which they depend.
recognizes a right to take fish, it reserves a portion of that fish stock itself that
should be equally recoverable in damages.

